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Abstract: Diffuse Water Pollution from Agriculture (DWPA) and its governance has received 
increased attention as a policy concern across the globe. Mitigation of DWPA is a complex problem 
that requires a mix of policy instruments and a multi-agency, broad societal response. In this paper, 
opportunities and barriers for developing co-governance, defined as collaborative societal 
involvement in the functions of government, and its suitability for mitigation of DWPA are 
reviewed using seven case studies in Europe (Poland, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands and UK), 
Australia (Murray-Darling Basin) and North America (State of Minnesota). An analytical 
framework for assessing opportunities and barriers of co-governance was developed and applied 
in this review. Results indicated that five key issues constitute both opportunities and barriers, and 
include: (i) pressure for change; (ii) connected governance structures and allocation of resources and 
funding; (iii) leadership and establishment of partnerships through capacity building; (iv) use and 
co-production of knowledge; and (v) time commitment to develop water co-governance. 
Keywords: collaborative governance; decentralized decision-making; non-point source pollution; 
nutrient management; water governance 
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1. Introduction 
Diffuse water pollution from agriculture (DWPA) can consist of nutrients from fertilizers and 
manure, sediment, pesticides, and salinity from irrigation return flows. It constitutes a threat to water 
quality and aquatic ecosystems in many farmed regions of the world [1–7]. Information regarding 
DWPA is incomplete and asymmetrical; the polluters often have more information than the 
regulators [8]. This makes mitigation a difficult challenge for public policy and governments, 
requiring complex, multi-faceted solutions [9,10]. 
Sources of DWPA can include agricultural fields and feedlots, rural domestic wastewater treatment 
systems, private gardens, wildlife, golf courses and other sport facilities. This makes DWPA more difficult 
to monitor and regulate than visible point sources, such as discharge from factories and large-scale urban 
wastewater treatment plants. Consequently, when adopted as a sole policy measure, the costs of 
regulation and its monitoring and enforcement will be high and likely prohibitive [11–13]. Diffuse Water 
Pollution from Agriculture is conventionally managed through a combination of policy instruments 
[10,14]. These can include command and control regulation, such as nationally set limits for applied 
nitrogen per hectare; voluntary adoption of best management practices resulting in environmental and 
farm management improvements; and market-based incentives such as fertilizer taxes, “cap-and-trade” 
schemes for nutrient or given agro-chemical use in a given area, and payments for ecosystem service (PES) 
compensation for production and income foregone [15]. 
None of these policies are likely to be sufficient and cost-effective if used alone. Advocates of 
command and control regulation argue that it can internalize the cost of pollution and provide a 
continuing incentive to improve agricultural practices in ways that minimize use of the polluting 
input. This has proven to be effective in reducing excess use of nutrients in farming in some regions 
and countries [16], but, when used in isolation, a “command and control” approach may not be a 
cost-effective and sustainable long-term solution to secure clean water [17], especially if such 
regulation is not accepted as reasonable and legitimate by stakeholders, and is thus met with social 
and political resistance and by poor levels of stakeholder compliance [18]. 
Voluntary adoption of best management practices encouraged by farm advisory systems can 
elucidate opportunities to protect the environment, whilst also saving on farm production and labour 
costs. Examples include soil testing and precision application of fertilizers, along with proper manure 
management. High rates of adoption may be difficult to achieve without a complementary “stick” 
provided by (a threat of) regulation, and, if change in practice is constrained by farm income or 
availability of capital for investment, a complementary “carrot” provided by subsidies and other 
forms of financial support may be necessary. 
Information needs, costs, difficulty of monitoring, and attribution to a source, limit the scope to 
directly tax DWPA emissions. Taxes on the polluting inputs, such as fertilizer, have been employed, 
but effectiveness may be constrained by inelastic demand and trade competitiveness at feasible price 
levels. Such policy may also risk pollution swapping, and if applied uniformly at a national scale, 
may exhibit a poor match with local variation in ecosystem capacity to absorb pollution [10]. “Cap-
and-trade” type schemes for inputs use or emissions have potential too, but are demanding of 
information and institutional development. Lastly, PES style compensation requires at least a 
complementary baseline of simple and enforceable regulation to distinguish between environmental 
standards that farmers are expected to meet at their own cost and higher standards for which society 
is willing to pay. Budget constraints will necessitate spatial targeting, whilst the challenge of 
monitoring necessitates high levels of voluntary compliance. 
The complexities of this policy agenda, the diverse range of actors involved, and the need for 
budgetary efficiencies, spatial targeting, and voluntary compliance have implications for governance 
[19,20]. To improve the effectiveness of DWPA policy design and implementation, there is a need for 
improved knowledge on, first, which governance forms, structures, mechanisms and processes help 
tailor and deliver the right combination of regulation, incentives and voluntarism in a given location; 
and, second, how these governance forms, structures, mechanisms and processes can be developed 
given prevailing institutional opportunities and barriers. 
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Governance refers to how a society and its economy are managed, including its institutions, 
organizations and policies [21]. Besides such generic usage, “governance” has been understood in 
political science as a shift from government by solely state actors and institutions to multi-level and 
polycentric forms, involving private and civil society actors, along with distribution of responsibility 
and authority (e.g., [22–25]). This can result in collaborative governance or “co-governance”, which 
we define as direct societal involvement in the core functions of government [26]. Co-governance can 
be characterized as multi-level and polycentric, with tasks delegated to the most suitable scale given 
existing responsibilities, local specificities and the scale of the issues concerned [10,27]. Thus, co-
governance refers to the transition from hierarchical governance and exercise of power by the state, 
to more dispersed and relational power, often exercised in layered networks of governmental actors 
and stakeholders that enter into collaborative relationships with each other. The role of government 
becomes one of process facilitation, rather than command and control. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of alternative governance 
arrangements for management of DWPA. It presents new knowledge on the effectiveness of co-
governance arrangements using an analysis of seven international case studies. It focuses on the 
identification of key enabling factors (opportunities) and constraining factors (barriers) for the 
development of effective co-governance arrangements for the mitigation of DWPA. 
First, we present the method and cases. Then, we discuss in more detail co-governance for 
DWPA mitigation and develop a framework for analysing the case studies. Finally, we present the 
result of applying this framework to the seven cases, and draw several conclusions. 
2. Materials and Methods—Case Studies on Water Co-Governance 
In this study, a multiple case study design was applied [28], involving seven DWPA and co-
governance arrangements (Table 1). Much of the literature on co-governance discusses single-case 
studies [29], but here a diverse set of case studies were selected to represent heterogeneity in the 
nature and severity of DWPA, the bio-physical, socio-economic and governance contexts, and 
governance approaches (see Appendix A for further description of the individual cases). 
Table 1. Selected case studies. 
Case Study Location Diffuse Water Pollution from Agriculture 
Norsminde catchment Denmark Nitrogen in surface waters 
Tullstorp stream Sweden Nutrients in surface waters 
Province of Overijssel The Netherlands Nitrogen in groundwater 
The Catchment Based Approach UK Sediment, nutrients and pesticides 
Kocinka catchment Poland Nutrients in surface waters 
State of Minnesota USA Nutrients in surface waters 
Murray-Darling Basin Australia Salinity in surface and groundwater 
The seven cases were selected at an international workshop on water co-governance held in 
Copenhagen in 2016. The workshop (International workshop on Water co-governance—
opportunities and barriers for effective decentralized decision-making in nonpoint source regulation 
of agriculture, held in Copenhagen, Denmark 28–29 November 2016) was initiated, co-organized and 
co-developed by the first author. At the workshop, 16 participants working with governance and 
DWPA theoretically and in practice were invited to present and share experiences regarding 
opportunities, barriers and outcomes from diverse co-governance frameworks (see Appendix E for a 
list of participants attending the workshop). The cases were selected by a case selection strategy based 
on having both most similar and typical cases on DWPA (DK, Sweden, NL and UK) and the most 
different and diverse cases on DWPA (USA, Australia, and Poland) [30]. By analysing both most 
similar and most different cases, the strategy was to be able to capture both the opportunities and 
barriers for improved water co-governance under different institutional arrangements. The aim of 
the workshop was to gather qualitative insights on opportunities and barriers for effective mitigation 
of DWPA. Researchers and practitioners were invited to present examples of how mitigation of 
DWPA was approached from a governance perspective. The workshop agenda progressed from 
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empirical descriptive presentations of the seven case studies to the development of an analytical 
framework for comparative analysis (see Section 3 and Appendices B–D). 
After the workshop, an electronic survey was prepared and distributed to the participating 
researchers to obtain further details about the cases. The case study experts scored each case for the 
key indicators that were developed as part of the analytical framework, using Likert-type scales [31]. 
This was supplemented by observational data and a narrative report of key processes and outcomes 
for each case study (see Appendix A for the narrative report summary and Appendix D for an 
overview of the survey structure). 
2.1. Analytical Framework 
To identify opportunities and barriers for effective co-governance for mitigation of DWPA, an 
analytical framework was developed at the aforementioned workshop. This included the 
specification of indicators of effective co-governance. The use of such indicators can help to simplify 
and describe the case and communicate the findings in a detailed and structured way [32]. 
The analysis framework developed consists of six indicators: two contextual indicators ((i) 
pressure for change; and (ii) institutional arrangements (the degree of delegation of decision making 
by task)); two process indicators (iii) the ability to develop and/or use innovative solutions; and (iv) 
the use of local knowledge); and two outcome indicators (v) goal achievement; and (vi) cost-
effectiveness) (Figure 1). This framework focuses on the nature and performance of co-governance 
currently observable in each case study. It is acknowledged that it does not itself address wider 
contextual factors including socio-economic and socio-political facilitators or constraints, although 
key issues are identified as concisely as possible in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 1. Indicators of effective co-governance for mitigation of Diffuse Water Pollution from 
Agriculture. 
2.2. Pressure for Change 
The pressure for change indicator expresses the degree to which DWPA is recognized as a 
societal and political concern and a cause of environmental, social and economic costs. In studies 
completed in regions where farmers do not believe that agriculture contributes to water pollution, 
there is a low level of perceived pressure for change amongst the polluters, which may contribute to 
low uptake of DWPA mitigation measures [33]. In other examples, wider non-agricultural 
stakeholders put DWPA on the political agenda, resulting in an increased pressure for change from 
those experiencing the impacts of pollution (e.g., [34]). 
A low level of pressure is unlikely to result in more than incremental change to existing 
regulation, policies and procedures, whilst a greater pressure for change is likely to result in 
widespread media coverage and increased societal awareness. This can prompt a political response, 
including emergency and longer-term measures. 
Pressure for change is ranked from low, moderate, major to severe (see Appendix C). It is 
hypothesized that there may be a relationship between the level of pressure for change and the degree 
to which co-governance has developed in each case. 
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2.3. Institutional Arrangements 
For this indicator or rather group of indicators, institutional arrangements are analysed in terms 
of the allocation of decision-making tasks relevant to DWPA mitigation; i.e., “who is responsible for 
which tasks”. The tasks are expressed in terms of steps in the policy cycle (policy formation, policy 
implementation and policy evaluation), and the allocation is expressed in terms of scale: local, 
regional or central (see Appendix B). The aim is to explore how responsibilities for DWPA mitigation 
are shared or not shared between actors and levels of government, whether delegation occurs at the 
level most suitable to account for existing responsibilities and local specificities, and to be most 
effective for decision making for the issues concerned. 
2.4. Process Indicators 
Many indicators of successful co-governance processes have been identified in the literature and 
are sometimes also described as intermediary outcomes [35]. Process outcomes do not relate to a 
direct change in mitigation of DWPA at the point of time at which they are evaluated but can be 
essential to attain the expected outcome achievements [36]. The two process indicators chosen for this 
study can help describe how co-governance has been developed and what the cases are doing to 
address the DWPA problem. The two process indicators are the following: 
(1) The ability to develop and/or use innovative solutions in mitigating DWPA. In other words, how 
effectively do the stakeholders collaborate in developing and adopting solutions? 
(2) The use of local knowledge. This refers to: (a) the capacity for knowledge sharing, i.e. 
openness/accessibility of public sector data (including that of municipalities and water 
companies); and (b) the effectiveness of using data and knowledge (combining the use of public 
sector knowledge/data and local/private knowledge/data). 
These indicators were ranked on a scale from none, weak, moderate, good to excellent (see 
Appendix C). 
2.5. Outcome Indicators 
The ultimate aims of DWPA mitigation are ecological and economic improvement. For these, many 
indicators can be found [35]. In this study, effectiveness is defined in terms of achieving two outcomes: 
(1) Goal achievement is assessed as the ability of governance arrangements to significantly 
contribute to achieve statutory local or national goals for DWPA mitigation and ecological 
improvement [35]. 
(2) Cost-effectiveness is assessed as: (a) the ability of case governance arrangements to ensure that 
desired outcomes are being delivered affordably with the use of available resources; and (b) the 
ability of case governance arrangements to deliver desired outcomes at the lowest cost [35]. 
These indicators were ranked on a scale from none, weak, moderate, good to excellent (see 
Appendix C). 
2.6. Opportunities and Barriers for Water Co-Governance 
Based on the analysis of the contextual, process and outcome indicators, key issues are identified 
in the different cases that create either opportunities or barriers for co-governance for DWPA 
mitigation. Further data to inform this are drawn from the workshop presentations, workshop 
discussion and narrative template completed by case experts (see Appendixes A–E). 
3. Results 
3.1. Pressure for Change 
For the European cases, the assessment of pressure for change ranges from low to major. In the 
USA case, the ranking is moderate, and for the Australian case severe (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Expert rankings of the “pressure for change” (for mitigation of DWPA). 
Case Study Pressure for Change 
Norsminde catchment (Denmark) Moderate to Major 
Tullstorp stream (Sweden) Low to Moderate 
Province of Overijssel (The Netherlands) Moderate to Major 
Catchment based approach (United Kingdom) Major 
Kocinka catchment (Poland) Low 
State of Minnesota (USA) Moderate 
Murray-Darling Basin (Australia) Severe 
These assessments are made at the catchment/case study scale and relate to the perceived pressure 
for change from stakeholders. For example, in the Polish case based on the Kocinka catchment, there is 
a low level of pressure for change from farmers and rural communities. The area is rural and relatively 
economically underdeveloped, and, although farming is a significant source of water pollution, it is not 
highly intensive so there is little recognition amongst the farming community of the need for change. 
However, pressure for change, at national level and amongst stakeholders in government, is much 
higher (Appendix A.5), given the need to transpose and implement relevant EU directives and 
international concern regarding Poland’s contribution to nutrient pollution of the Baltic Sea. 
In the Swedish case, pressure for change was low when the Tullstorp stream association was 
initiated in 2009, as the national response to DWPA. The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) was 
at early stage of development, but local stakeholders were motivated to prepare for the introduction 
of new legislation, suggesting a moderate pressure for change from farmers and the rural community. 
In the Danish and Dutch cases, the pressure for change in each locality was assessed as moderate, 
but the pressure for change at the national level was major. This is because mitigation of DWPA is a 
high profile, politicized and controversial issue within both Danish and Dutch society, given the 
trade-offs between the profitability of intensive agriculture and better water quality. In the 1980s, 
severe pressure for change was put on policy-makers to deal with DWPA in Denmark, which 
initiated a range of action plans, that were almost all implemented with a top-down approach [16]. 
The UK case concerns the national level rather than a local catchment situation, and the pressure 
for change has been assessed as “major”. The launch of the Catchment-Based Approach (CaBA) by 
government was part of the response to widespread pressures for improved implementation of the 
WFD, which led to environmental NGOs threatening to use a judicial review (Appendix A.4). At a 
local level, stakeholders including farmers recognized an impending threat of stricter and more 
vigorously enforced water protection regulation, but also an opportunity for more integrated land 
and water management strategies. 
In the USA case, also larger in scale (the state of Minnesota), a co-governance framework for water 
quality was developed because of pressure in the form of stricter federal government requirements 
(USEPA), which were triggered by eutrophication problems in the Mississippi River contributing to the 
Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone [37]. A critical factor was also the approval by state voters of an increase 
in sales tax for investment in cleaner water and other environmental improvements. 
The Australian case is also large scale. In the Murray-Darling Basin, salinity can render water 
unusable for drinking and reduce agricultural yields and thereby farmer income. (Australia is an 
ancient dry continent and salt has accumulated in the landscape over millennia. While having 
economic benefits, the massive increase in irrigation started mobilizing the salt and river salinity 
started increasing. By the early 1980s, salinity levels at Morgan in South Australia exceeded 800 EC 
units (500 mg/L) for 18 months on end. In time, salinity levels have reached peaks of 1400 EC units, 
threatening the future of drinking water and irrigated horticulture. Ideally, drinking water should 
have less than 800 EC (WHO aesthetic limit), and horticultural crops are impacted above 500 EC. The 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy set a target to reduce the salinity levels at Morgan below a 90% 
percentile of 800 EC units for a benchmark climatic period). The fact that salinity was affecting the 
profitability of farms played a vital role that helped initiate co-governance. The upstream states of 
New South Wales and Victoria wish to manage water tables and discharge saline drainage water, but 
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the downstream state of South Australia cannot tolerate high salinity levels. These pressures for 
change were therefore assessed as severe. 
3.2. Institutional Arrangements 
In all of the European cases, with exception to the Swedish study, the central government has the 
task and statutory responsibility of choosing goals and setting targets for mitigating DWPA (see Table 
3). In Sweden, the goals related to the implementation of the WFD and are chosen at the regional level. 
In the USA case, the tasks of choosing goals and setting targets are shared between the central 
level and local government. To meet Federal requirements, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
(MPCA) must complete Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for impaired State waters. 
Impairment goals are set based on these TMDL reports, but the methods for prioritizing and 
addressing the impairments are defined by each county’s Soil and Water Conservation agency, a 
Local Government Unit. Although the initial goals are set by the State in the form of Total Maximum 
Daily Loads, the local government establishes what the specific, more local goals will be and then 
they are shared with the MPCA, at the State level. 
In the Australian case, choosing goals and setting the target for salinity management is a shared 
responsibility of the central and local level. The goals, targets and strategic framework of the Salinity 
and Drainage Strategy were developed by the then Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC), 
replaced by the Murray-Darling Authority, in 2007. The MDBC was established as an unincorporated 
joint venture bringing together officials from three States and the Federal Government; however, the 
MDBC consulted with affected communities in developing the targets. In this way, the regional 
Salinity Action Plans (SAP) were developed by communities (bottom up) to achieve the target. The 
development of the Basin wide strategy was achieved by an effective partnership between the Federal 
and State governments (central level). The regional communities supported the strategy and 
developed their own partnerships with local stakeholders [38]. 
For tasks beyond setting of goals and targets (listed as (c)–(j) in Table 3), there is more diversity 
in the allocation of responsibility across the cases. The cases from Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Poland and Australia tend to exhibit a greater degree of decentralisation for tasks related to action 
planning and implementation. 
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Table 3. Analysis of task allocation, showing an overview of responsibility for “who makes decisions” (who is responsible for which tasks) in the different steps in 
decision-making (a)–(j). 
Cases 
Tasks— “who is responsible for which tasks”:  
C = Central; R = Regional; L = local 
Norsminde (DK) Tullstorp (SE) Overijssel (NL) CaBA (UK) Kocinka (PL) Minnesota (USA) MDB c (AUS) 
(a) Choosing goal C R C C C C + L (State a) C d + R e 
(b) Setting targets C R L (R) C + L C C (State) C + R 
(c) Allocation of resources for action plans C C R C + L C C (State) C + R 
(d) Prepare action plans C R L R + L C + R C (State) L f 
(e) Approve action plans C C + R R C + R C C (State) C + R 
(f) Implementation L L L R + L R + L R (LGU b) + L R + L 
(g) Receipt of resources for action plans L R + L L R + L R + L R (LGU) R 
(h) Monitoring and control C C + R + L R R + L C + R C (State) R 
(i) Data collection C C R + L R + L C + R C (State) + R (LGU) R + L 
(j) Data use C + L R R + L C + R + L C + R C (State) C + R + L 
a State is a state agency for Minnesota, b Local Government Unit (LGU) is the county or catchment scale, c Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), d Central refers to the river 
basin authority (the Murray-Darling Basin Commission), e Regional was applied to State Governments (in the Australian federal system), f Local refers to the 
community groups that developed the local Salinity Action Plans. 
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3.2.1. Development and Use of Innovative Solutions and Use of Local Knowledge and Data 
The Australian and USA cases stand out as scoring highest for the process and outcome 
indicators (see Table 4). The Netherlands and UK cases also exhibit some success by this measure. 
An important part of the success in the Australian case has been locally developed innovative 
solutions, involving mapping and surveying regional soil salinity levels, in addition to re-allocating 
irrigation water away from the more saline soils (two highest soil salinity categories). This approach 
required a huge shift in community thinking, but because the decision was made by the local 
community, it was implemented. All data were shared across the area affected by the Basin Salinity 
and Drainage Strategy. Community groups preparing the plans had access to a high level of advice 
and knowledge from experts in the government agencies and access to all the available data. At the 
same time, the strategy and framework for the development of the SAP required co-production using 
both local knowledge of the local community group developing the SAP, and the scientific 
knowledge of State experts (e.g., hydrogeological), informed by the strategic framework provided by 
the Basin Salinity and Drainage Strategy. 
In the Minnesota case, knowledge sharing and co-production of knowledge are continuing to 
improve with the process that has been deployed through the water quality framework. The One 
Watershed, One Plan (1W1P) (see Appendix A.6) approach has enhanced the local commitment to 
addressing the problem. There is an understanding that there is not an easy fix when it comes to 
water quality improvement. Rather, there are multi-faceted barriers that require everyone to 
collaborate and work together to address the problem holistically. 
In the Dutch case, the leading example of innovation and use of local knowledge is that 
mitigation measures are identified and implemented together with the farmers at the farm level, 
based on the so-called Annual Nutrient Cycle Assessment (ANCA), with data from the farm. In the 
UK, Catchment Partnerships created under the CaBA are demonstrating success in stakeholder 
engagement, partnership working, leverage of multiple funding sources and used of shared data and 
decision support tools for local level planning [39]. 
The rankings for the Danish local case are moderate overall. Here, the preparation of action plans 
and the selection of measures are decided at the central government level and implementation has to 
follow national guidelines. New policies are typically implemented at national level without prior 
pilot projects. Altogether, the conditions for introducing innovative solutions are not good. The local 
catchment council has been excellent in implementing drainage solutions and wetlands by 
themselves; however, there is no coordination with official authorities. 
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Table 4. Processes and outcome indicators for effectiveness. 















Development and use of innovative solutions Weak Moderate Good Excellent Weak Good Good 
Use of local knowledge and data 1—Knowledge sharing—openness/accessibility of public 
sector scientific data (including that of municipalities and water companies) 
None Good Excellent Moderate Weak Good Good 
Use of local knowledge and data 2—Co-production of knowledge—combined use of 
scientific data and local knowledge/data 
Moderate None Good Good Weak Good Good 
Goal achievement Good Excellent Good/Weak 1 Moderate None Moderate Excellent 
Cost effectiveness 1—desired outcomes being delivered affordably with the use of 
available resources 
Moderate Good Good/Weak 1 Good None Good Good 
Cost effectiveness 2—desired outcomes being delivered at a lower cost than by alternative 
means as far as can be determined or judged 
Weak Weak Good/Weak1 Excellent None Good Good 
1 Good at farm scale for participating farmers, weak at the scale of the recharge area considering that only approximately 20% of the agricultural area participates 
in program activity. 
 
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1634 11 of 39 
3.2.2. Goal Achievement and Cost-Effectiveness 
The development of the regional SAP in the Australian case has been successful in that the 
salinity target was reached in 2010 through the introduction of salinity debits and credits, water 
trading rules and salinity levies. At present, salinity levels are continuing to decline in the river basin. 
The formation of a river basin authority and the development of a single salinity strategy for the 
southern MDB allowed all the salt mitigation measures to be ranked according to cost-effectiveness 
(salt removed from the river/$). The strategy thereby assured that the most cost-effective options were 
selected and implemented. If the four States involved (Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia 
and Queensland) had made SAPs individually, higher cost solutions would have been selected 
because each State would have only been capable of investing within its own borders. 
In the USA case, there is moderate evidence that the 1W1P process adopted in Minnesota will 
lead to well-coordinated implementation. All local and State agencies join together to inform the 
process, but ultimately the implementation plan is driven by the priorities of local stakeholders to 
refine the previously identified catchment-based strategies into an actionable path forward. The 
success can be explained by the programs for federal and State implementation funding being 
utilized by Local Government Units (LGUs) and landowners at the catchment scale. This suggests 
that the local implementation has been a defining factor for the Minnesota program. A key goal in 
this case has been to engage more people in the science available and the issues at hand, which can 
be seen by more programs currently being initiated to improve public outreach. 
The Swedish case is an example of a bottom-up process initiated and driven by the landowners 
themselves. The goals were set by the landowners and are in some ways far from co-governance in 
that no authorities are directly involved in the project, as opposed to the USA and Australian cases. 
However, in the Swedish case, the landowners have achieved their own goal for implementation of 
measures and have restored 10 km of the stream and created 35 wetlands in the catchment.  
In the Danish case, the top-down centralized regulation has been successful in goal achievement 
and ensured that farmers in Denmark have reduced nitrate leaching from the root zone by almost 
50% between 1987 and 2007, through command and control measures [16]. However, additional 
reductions of 30–50% will be required to meet the WFD objectives of good ecological status. It has 
been suggested that to achieve these environmental objectives, agri-environmental measures should 
be spatially targeted to fields where nature is less effective at removing or retaining nitrogen [40,41]. 
The Dutch case shows evidence of both a decrease in the nitrate concentration of groundwater 
and an improvement in the economic performance of farms. The nitrate concentration decreased from 
approximately 90 to 75 mg NO3/L in the period 2011 to 2015, and the economic result of the 
implemented measures increased approximately €97 per hectare. This shows that outcomes can be 
delivered at a lower cost than by alternative means, and that the combination of top-down and 
bottom-up structures in the Netherlands makes goal achievement feasible and cost effective at the 
farm level. The success was achieved by setting clear targets at the farm level in combination with 
use of the farm management tool ANCA for monitoring. However, due to the voluntary nature of 
the project, only 20% of the farmers in the agricultural area participated. Hence, the achievement of 
regional goals at the scale of the recharge area has been limited, and at the national level, objectives 
for complying with the WFD objectives have not yet been met. 
In the UK, the pilot and evaluation phase of the CaBA was concluded in March 2013. Over time, 
it is expected that the CaBA approach will mature as a mechanism for ensuring that there is strong 
local support, consensus, effective coordination, and efficient channelling of existing finances, new 
funding, and additional resources to deliver local aspirations for the water environment. The CaBA 
partnerships drive cost-effective practical delivery on the ground, resulting in multiple benefits, 
including improvements to water quality, enhanced biodiversity, reduced flood risk, resilience to 
climate change, and greater community engagement with the local river. 
A contrasting case to the northwestern EU, Australian and USA cases is the Polish case. Poland 
has been successful in terms of achieving goals related to improving the water quality status of 
particular water bodies and has made progress in terms of harmonizing existing water legislation 
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and its water governance structure with EU requirements. However, Poland’s performance in 
engaging local stakeholders has largely fallen short of the objectives set in the WFD, consistent with 
the results summarized with the Kocinka case. 
Although there is some diversity, the rankings in Tables 2–4 tend to suggest that the European 
cases, which all operate under EU Directives related to DWPA (the WFD and the Nitrate Directive), 
are less developed in terms of their co-governance processes and outcomes for mitigation of DWPA 
than the Australian and USA cases. In the next section, key issues for these differences are discussed. 
4. Discussion 
The case study results suggest that the contextual, process and outcomes indicators for co-
governance of DWPA mitigation are positively related. The two cases that score highest on the 
contextual indicators, the USA and Australian cases, also score highest on the process and outcome 
indicators. In this section, we discuss the opportunities and barriers for effective co-governance. 
4.1. Pressure for Change 
Pressure for change to mitigate DWPA can come from citizen’s expectations concerning water 
quality; from government in response to either citizen expectations or demands from higher-level 
government; and from farmers if DWPA harms their crops or to avert strict government regulation. 
If high enough, any pressure for change is an opportunity for effective co-governance, as shown in 
the USA and Australian cases. What may explain the shift in governance in the Australian case in 
comparison to the European cases, is that the pressure for change was severe and came from both 
political enforcement and societal concerns (see Table 2). The severe salinity issue in the MDB has 
been a major factor in achieving joint action and community support. A clear community 
understanding of the threat created political capital for reform, allowing governments and 
community groups to make some tough decisions. The fact that rising salinity directly impacted the 
profitability of the farms was also a key factor in persuading farmers and their communities to accept 
difficult decisions. Mitigation of DWPA can be difficult because the costs are individual and often 
upstream, while the benefits are often collective and downstream. Salinity has more immediate 
consequences for crops and drinking water supply than, for example, nitrate pollution, which can 
make mobilization of stakeholders, resources and change to mitigate salinity less difficult than it may 
be to mitigate nitrate pollution. 
When the stakes are high and clear, as in the Australian case, this can create an opportunity for 
action and allocation of resources. This may be contrasted with the Polish case concerning nitrates, 
where pressure for change was lower due to lack of information and resources. 
Pressure for change may also be primarily “top-down” and from government, as in the Swedish, 
Danish, Dutch and UK cases. Nutrient pollution can be very damaging to water quality, but not 
necessarily an issue for farmers unless national or international (EU) regulation limits the use of 
fertilizers and manures. Political and societal concerns may play a role as well, either as an 
opportunity or an obstacle. 
For example, in the Dutch case, parliament decided that WFD-implementation should not lead 
to additional costs for the agricultural sector (Parliamentary Papers 2002, 27 625 Water Policy, 
Amendment Van der Vlies No. 92). This implies that in specific vulnerable areas, where the existing 
general rules on the use of manure and pesticides are insufficient, the WFD objectives may not be 
reached [42]. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector and especially younger farmers, have taken 
initiatives to introduce more sustainable farming practices on a voluntary basis. 
The situation in the Danish case is similar. The newest N-reduction target for Norsminde by 2016 
is about 70%. Studies have shown that such reductions can only be achieved by taking 50% of the 
agricultural land out of production [43]. The present Danish Minister of Environment and Food has 
stated that even a 10% reduction of agricultural area will not happen during his term, showing the 
difficulties for change when there is low pressure. 
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4.2. Connected Governance Structures and Allocation of Resources and Funding 
A second key opportunity found in this study is the need for establishing connected governance 
structures (multi-level governance) in the institutional arrangements of mitigating DWPA. Many 
water systems are rather large (e.g., the Murray-Darling Basin) and may require a coordinated 
approach to maximize effectiveness and manage conflicts. 
In the Australian and USA cases, we see that this issue is addressed by creating multi-level 
governance partnerships. 
In the Australian case, many of the decision-making processes are shared between the central (river 
basin authority), regional (State governments) and local level (community groups). The community 
groups were formed by the State governments to develop the SAP. Since the Murray River flows through 
three States, the central level had to be involved as well. The Salinity and Drainage Strategy provides an 
example of balancing top down governance establishing targets and directing investment with bottom up 
governance reflecting the practicalities of addressing local problems. 
In the USA case, the 1W1P vision had the purpose to align local water planning with State 
strategies. Although the initial goals are set by the State (i.e., meeting a specific water quality goal) 
the local government establishes what the specific more “local” goals will be and then they are shared 
at the State level. This kind of framework is trying to provide more ownership at the local catchment 
so that there is more collaboration and communication between all parties at the local scale as they 
work to meet the State goals. This results in a connected governance structures and decentralization 
of responsibility down to the most effective scale. 
The main finding of the Australian, USA and UK cases is that targets and goals can be set at the central 
level if this is done in coordination with the local actors that are responsible for local implementation. 
An explanation why water co-governance has not been so developed in the other European 
countries is that the institutional arrangements in many of the European countries are top-down and 
centralized (see Table 3). The Dutch case shows that if the co-governance initiative is purely voluntary 
and no central authority is part of the process, there is a low rate of participation and a risk of free riding 
behaviour (Appendix A.3). In the case study area WFD targets (50 mg NO3/L) were translated into 
targets for each participating farmer, to be realized by improving agricultural management. Plans are 
set-up and agreed on with the individual farmers. However, because of the voluntary character of the 
project, the plans have no formal status and there are no sanctions if they are not implemented. 
In addition, the Danish and Swedish cases show that purely farmer driven, bottom up initiatives 
are not enough in themselves (Appendixes A.1 and A.2). There will be a lack of integration in the formal 
regulatory framework, and central or regional goal setting is necessary for the creation of legitimacy 
and continuity in developing solutions for mitigating DWPA. Co-governance is by definition a process 
of interaction in which either the State “invites” stakeholders to participate in its core activities [26] or 
the stakeholders mobilize the State to engage in joint solutions of DWPA problems. Therefore, if there 
are no joint action and connected governance structures initiated either by the government or by 
stakeholders, no genuine or effective water co-governance is likely to develop. 
Another key finding, related to the need for connected governance structures, is that 
hydrological boundaries, e.g., the watershed, and administrative boundaries often do not coincide. It 
is then important that the collaboration across administrative boundaries takes place. In the 
Australian case, for instance, implementation of cost-effective measures was made possible because 
the involved authorities cooperated across administrative borders. In the first stage, the most cost-
effective salt mitigation schemes were in South Australia, which resulted in Victoria and New South 
Wales investing their funds in South Australia. 
Another key finding from the Australian and USA cases is that delegation of authority to lower 
level actors requires allocation of funding and freedom to spend the funds according to locally chosen 
priorities. Resources and funding are essential to coordinate and host meetings, prepare reports and 
supporting documentation and implement communication and outreach efforts. 
In the Australian case, the salinity issue required fundamental reforms. The River Murray 
Commission, which had been established in 1915 to manage water flows in the Murray River, had no 
role in water quality and its powers did not extend beyond the main river. In 1987, the Murray-
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Darling Basin Commission was created and the MDB Ministerial Council formed, which was 
assigned the key decision-making role. The first task of this new Commission was to develop the 
Salinity and Drainage Strategy. The strategy was successful and based on a combination of centrally 
driven governance and community consultation supported by local Salinity Action Plans, which were 
developed from the ground up by community groups empowered by regional (State) governments. 
4.3. Establishment of Partnerships and Strong Leadership 
The Australian, USA, UK and in part the Netherlands cases indicate that a key enabling factor for 
effective water co-governance is creating an institutional and administrative framework within which 
stakeholders with different interests can discuss and agree to cooperate and coordinate their actions. 
Therefore, partnerships are important and may function where other governing structures do not [21,29]. 
These cases support the findings from the literature that co-governance happens when affected 
stakeholders are engaged in an equal partnership and the stakeholders share their perspectives on 
the development and implementation of policies [44,45]. This implies that decision-making powers 
are shared with stakeholders affected by the policy (polycentric governance) [46]. 
The Polish case provides a contrasting example for the importance of partnership. Poland is 
characterized by a weak civil society with low levels of trust [47,48]. Low levels of trust are indicative 
of an unwillingness to participate and collaborate. The lack of a participatory culture in Poland is a 
major barrier to realizing water co-governance. A key lesson from the Polish case is that, due to lack 
of trust, there is a lack of support for delegating power from the central level to local level government 
and stakeholders. This can be explained with narrow perceptions of defining participatory 
approaches by the national government, revealing a reluctance towards devolving power to local 
levels of government. 
In the Swedish case, the project manager was active in starting the project and provided the 
necessary leadership, perhaps because governmental did not. By having another person facilitate the 
process, the manager had the time and resources to search for additional funding and deal with 
administrative issues. Landowners would probably have been overwhelmed by these tasks if done 
alone. Trust in the “leader” is essential for establishing good relationship, but because the project 
manager was a farmer. All the landowners had trust in this person and in the first stage they all 
signed the agreement sending a positive signal to other landowners. Another important lesson from 
the Swedish case is that to establish partnerships, meetings also have to serve as a social get-together 
with the chance of exchanging information and knowledge. The question is whether the lessons from 
the Swedish case also apply elsewhere in Sweden and can be used to achieve national goals and 
integrate national regulatory frameworks.  
One of the main reasons why there is currently no co-governance in the Polish Kocinka 
catchment is the missing need for action, along with the lack of ownership and leadership for starting 
such an initiative. In the USA case, a key issue was that a successful program requires clear 
communication regarding roles and expectations. 
An important lesson from the Dutch case was that individual support and coaching by agricultural 
advisors was a major factor for implementation and participation in the project. This coaching was 
carried out by senior experts interested in the farmer and his management and providing advice based 
on farm specific conditions and practical experience of an experimental farm (De Marke) in the 
Netherlands. Without this support and coaching, the willingness of farmers to change and participate 
would have been substantially lower, reducing the chance of meeting the standards. 
4.4. Innovative Solutions Through the Use and Co-Production of Knowledge 
The co-governance structure in the Australian and USA cases has led to positive environmental 
outcomes by deploying new innovative solutions for water co-governance. For example, in the 
Australian case, the Nyah to the South Australian border SAP, contained a system of trading rules 
and levies to direct irrigation water away from high salinity impact zones to low impact zones. 
Additionally, stakeholders mapped the soil salinity levels in the Tragowell Plains SAP, which 
included a large data collection exercise by the local community and resulted in irrigation water being 
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transferred away from the two most salinized soil categories. Both innovations were developed by 
the local community and required effective interchange of knowledge between the State and Local 
SAP, effectively co-producing scientific (e.g., hydrogeological) and local knowledge of the 
community group developing the SAP [49]. 
Data sharing and co-production of knowledge have been identified as important process 
indicators for development and success of co-governance. In the Australian case, data were shared 
across the area affected by salinity. At the same time, the local SAP required knowledge co-
production combining local knowledge and experience with the scientific knowledge of State experts, 
informed by the strategic framework of the Basin Salinity & Drainage Strategy. 
Similarly, in Minnesota, community input through a public participation process helped to 
incorporate local knowledge into the strategies. The first round of 1W1P pilot projects were launched 
in 2014 with the intent to build on existing catchment efforts, using local plans together with state and 
local knowledge, implementing a systematic and science-based approach to catchment management. 
In the Swedish case, data are locally collected and shared openly, even though this knowledge 
sharing takes place only at the local level. Scientific actors and their expert knowledge are not 
involved in choosing the measures or integration of this knowledge at the catchment level or with 
other water councils. This is again related to the question of available funding and lack of multi-level 
coordination. The landowners are open to see improvements in environmental conditions if this does 
not hamper their business model in the absence of a coherent top-down framework of regulation and 
funding mechanisms. 
Rogers and Hall [21] showed in the analysis of principles for better governance that a 
collaborative process should be open and transparent. This requires that decision making is 
transparent so that both insiders and outsiders can follow the necessary steps.  
In the Dutch case, measures are identified and implemented together with the farmers at the farm 
level, based on the ANCA with farm scale data. Farmers are using the ANCA data to improve 
management for optimizing nutrient use efficiency. This is in contrast to the Polish case, where 
knowledge sharing is limited to the information and data that are relevant to achieving policy 
deliverables. Knowledge is collected at the local level and shared with higher levels of government, 
with central government determining what knowledge is relevant. At present, there is a limited 
opportunity for co-production of knowledge as collaboration and public engagement are largely absent. 
4.5. Developing Co-Governance Takes Time 
An additional and clear observation that emerges from the more successful case studies is that 
the development of effective co-governance is an evolutionary process that requires time. The USA 
case shows that finger-pointing to fix DWPA problems does not work. Rather, these problems are 
multi-faceted and require everyone to collaborate and work together to address the problem 
holistically. There are no easy fixes and it takes time. In the USA case, time and patience were essential 
to the development of the partnerships in order to create a catchment-based management plan. 
Taking time at the beginning to coordinate and ensure clear and consistent communication may 
smooth the process later. Including stakeholders with a range of expertise, backgrounds, and 
perspectives into the partnership and valuing their input resulted in more trust, which should lead 
to more acceptance and better implementation of the resulting strategy. 
In the Australian case, time for institutional development was also shown to be essential. It took 
a long time to reach a consensus over difficult issues in the MDB. 
In the Dutch case, considerable time was needed to build trust, create awareness, and show (with 
monitoring results and farm data) what role the farmers have in the DWPA and how the measures 
implemented help in reducing the nitrate concentration. 
5. Conclusions 
Co-governance is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. In the context of this paper, its value 
is its potential to enhance both better social outcomes and better water quality by better 
implementation of DWPA policies [50]. Evidence for improvement can be difficult to find, given 
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monitoring challenges and time lags. The seven cases applied in this study, have shown that actual 
environmental improvements can be achieved under co-governance arrangements. Moreover, this 
paper shows that five opportunities and barriers for water co-governance may exist and that 
experiences may be shared across catchments, regions and nations. 
In our study of the seven cases on water co-governance in a DWPA context, we have identified 
a number of opportunities and barriers for co-governance: 
1. pressure for change; 
2. connected governance structures and allocation of resources and funding; 
3. establishment of partnerships and strong leadership through capacity building; 
4. use and co-production of knowledge; and 
5. developing co-governance takes time. 
First, when dealing with a challenging problem such as DWPA mitigation, a high level of 
pressure for change (e.g., Australian case) can be an opportunity for co-governance development and 
a low level an obstacle (e.g., Polish case). However, social and political factors may play a role as well. 
This is shown in the Danish case, where societal pressure has pushed for reforms and regulation of 
the agricultural sector, which through the last 30 years have reduced the nitrogen leaching by 50%. 
Second, effective co-governance requires institutional arrangements in the form of multi-level 
governance structures that connect and coordinate top-down policy frameworks and funding 
mechanisms with bottom-up planning and implementation, the latter being essential for knowledge 
co-production, innovation and supporting voluntarism. The current provisions of the EU WFD 
directive could prompt and support such institutional arrangements because the WFD directive is a 
“framework” directive. It sets ambitious goals but there is flexibility for member states on how these 
are achieved. In turn, member states can delegate that responsibility to a local level. 
Third, establishment of partnerships and strong leadership through capacity building and 
knowledge sharing is essential for the development and support of connected governance structures. 
Member states need to invest in the capacity building necessary for the co-governance necessary to 
plan and manage change. The needs for horizontal integration and coordination are also important 
and could be further researched. This can facilitate planning alignment and complementarities in 
resource use and interventions. Relevant observation and literature also notes the importance of 
“bridging” or “boundary” organisations (e.g., [51]). 
Last, we have shown in our analysis that developing effective co-governance frameworks for 
mitigating DWPA takes considerable time to deliver upon intended objectives. At the same, it is 
important that stakeholders are involved early in the policy phases to create trust and commitment. 
It is also important that there is continuity in policy, political support for institutional arrangements 
and funding mechanisms. 
By focusing on a qualitative analysis of five opportunities and barriers in different contexts, we 
have identified new and transferable knowledge from our cases that expands the current knowledge 
of what makes multi-level co-governance work. 
The five opportunities and obstacles are by no means exhaustive, but if they were addressed 
comprehensively and consistently they offer real promise of sustainable environmental outcomes in 
the world’s important water systems. 
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Appendix A. Case Study Profiles—Narrative Summary 
Appendix A.1. Case Study Profile for Norsminde Catchment, Denmark—Nitrate Responses to Centralization 
and Hierarchical Governance 
Appendix A.1.1. Context 
The Norsminde Fjord catchment (101 km2) constitutes one of the 90 Danish catchments subject 
to nitrate reduction targets from a given coastal land area. Eighty-two per cent of the land use is 
agricultural land in rotation. According to the second generation of the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) (2015–2021), the Nitrogen (N) load to Norsminde Fjord 
is 132 T N/year, of which 86% originates from agriculture. The reduction target in the present RBMP 
is 37 T N/year, while a reduction of an additional 33 T N/year has been postponed to the third RBMP 
(2021–2027) [52]. 
This situation reflects one of the key problems Denmark is facing with respect to WFD 
implementation and goal achievement. Although Denmark has reduced nitrate leaching from the 
root zone by almost 50% between 1987 and 2007 [16], additional reductions of 30–50% will be required 
to meet the WFD objectives of good ecological status, even when climate change impacts are not 
considered. Mitigation is possible, however it will require measures both on agricultural fields and 
outside [41]. Under the current institutional arrangements and policy framework, reductions in 
nutrient inputs of this magnitude would have such serious impacts that agricultural operations in 
many regions would or may have to change. 
It has been suggested that agri-environmental measures should be spatially targeted to fields 
where nature provides least removal/retention of N. This can potentially achieve 5–10% additional 
nitrate reduction through optimal spatial location of for example catch crops, constructed mini-
wetlands, etc. To exploit the full potential of spatially targeted measures, nitrate retention maps with 
a fine spatial resolution (1–25 ha) are necessary. However, the level of uncertainty associated with 
maps at this resolution is too high for use in government top-down regulation.  
Hence, the government have used retention maps with typically >100 km2 resolution in areas 
where restrictions have been imposed. These maps have a lower level of uncertainty, but they also 
cancel out almost all economic and environmental gains of a spatially differentiated approach. Under 
a co-governance regime it should potentially be possible to exploit the information in fine scale 
retention maps and harvest part of the 5–10% extra reduction potential for optimal use of fields. The 
full potential of 5–10% can, however, not be reached due to uncertainty. In addition, it would become 
possible to exploit new drainpipe measures such as constructed wetlands, bioreactors and saturated 
buffer zones that potentially can reduce N even more. 
Appendix A.1.2. Pressure for Change 
The pressure level for this case is moderate to major. Nitrogen mitigation is a very political and 
controversial issue of major significance for the economy in the Danish agricultural sector, which is 
why the pressure for changes is major. However, at the same time, there is a moderate level of 
pressure for change because of the voluntariness of demands for implementation of measures. 
Problem to be Addressed 
How can the N reduction targets be achieved in a manner that allow profitable agriculture to 
continue?  
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Appendix A.1.3. Present Governance System 
The present governance system is centralised with the central government and Ministry for Food 
and Environment, and related agencies making all decisions regarding use of agri-environmental 
measures, including norms for fertilizer use, at farm level. 
In Denmark, the preparation of action plans and the selection of Programs of Measures (PoM) 
are decided at central government level, and the implementation has to follow national guidelines. 
At the same time, DWPA mitigation measures have been uniformly located irrespective of the local 
retention capacity, implying that it has not been very cost-effective. This is because new policies in 
Denmark typically are implemented at national level without prior pilot project experiments. This 
makes the local authorities and local stakeholders very dependent on the central government 
agencies’ catalogue of measures. To monitor and control implementation, the government requires 
farmers to report detailed fertilizer and field plans for cropping systems and fertilizer use. 
Government monitoring focuses on relatively large catchments to evaluate if the reduction targets to 
the coastal waters are achieved. Farmers fulfilling the central government requirements receive 
subsidies from the EU CAP and Rural Development Program. 
Appendix A.1.4. Main Activities 
In 2012, a catchment council of the Norsminde Fjord catchment was established. The catchment 
council is a voluntary local cooperative forum for stakeholders, farmers and authorities working 
together to contribute to achieving good environmental status in the fjord. There are currently 18–20 
members of the catchment council. Besides this council, regional water councils operate on river basin 
scale, which will in the future deliver the co-governance arrangements. 
The Danish case is a good example of a bottom-up initiative driven by local landowners, with 
the local catchment council, that has been very active in collaborating with research projects and in 
engaging farmers in discussions of N mitigation measures and governance. However, as the 
catchment council has no formal role in implementing DWPA measure, no Danish authorities are 
directly involved. 
Appendix A.1.5. Stakeholder Resources 
Danish farmers have a long tradition for cooperation among themselves and with authorities 
and researchers. Farmers are tired of the existing centralised governance regime and have expressed 
a desire to be empowered to make local decisions based on local data to collectively meet the nitrate 
reduction targets as long as it makes farming possible in the future [53]. However, farmers also 
question the new spatially differentiated approach, and have concerns on the effectiveness and 
implementation possibilities of this new approach. 
Besides the catchment council, there has been a short period with the experiment of introducing 
water councils at river basin district scale to solve stream issues in 2014 and again in 2017, in the 
whole of Denmark. Evidence from this water council process documents that there is an opportunity 
for more water co-governance in Denmark and that many local stakeholders are keenly interested in 
being actively involved in the decision-making process and implementation, despite the mandate of 
the temporary water councils being quite limited [54–56]. The central government, however, has 
hesitations to whether a co-governance structure would work in practice and the central authorities 
may not have sufficient capacity to deal with this very different type of governance. 
Appendix A.2. Case Study Profile for the Tullstorp Stream, Sweden—Governance and Strong Leadership 
Appendix A.2.1. Context 
Before the introduction of the WFD [57], Swedish water policy has traditionally been shaped by 
the central state as the regulatory authority, with the municipalities being the main actors for 
planning. The regional level has played a relatively minor, and mainly controlling, role [58]. 
Therefore, it is the 290 local municipalities that have had prime responsibility for long-term water 
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1634 19 of 39 
and land use planning [59]. Despite the dominance of municipal-level planning, some limited 
management activities did occur at the scale of waterways and catchments. For example, several 
Swedish municipalities formed voluntary joint water quality management associations at the 
catchment scale, although their activities were mainly limited to monitoring [60]. The introduction of 
the WFD has brought large changes to Swedish water governance: introducing the river basin as a 
geographical unit, establishing a new and parallel administrative system to the existing one, shifting 
from local to regional and super-regional planning scales and shifting the model for legitimization 
from local representative democracy to decision-making by experts complemented by stakeholder 
involvement [59,61]. 
The Tullstorp stream case is located in southern Sweden and the main objective of the project is 
to reduce the outflow of nutrients to the Baltic Sea. The Tullstorp stream is 30 km with a catchment 
area of 63 km2. Eighty-five per cent of the land is used for agricultural purposes. The project “aims to 
capture N and phosphorus from farmland, thus preventing it from reaching the sea, whilst reducing 
the need for maintenance and helping to address flooding problems and stream restoration” [62]. 
Appendix A.2.2. Pressure for Change 
For the Tullstorp Stream project example, there was no urgent need for being active. Thus, the 
pressure for change was moderate to low. One of the reasons the association was formed was to be 
more prepared once new laws, frameworks, etc. (similar to WFD) are adopted. The activity was very 
much driven by private initiative of a major landowner. 
Appendix A.2.3. Problem to be Addressed 
In Sweden as a whole, water resources are not scarce compared to many other countries. There 
is, generally, enough water for drinking, industrial/agricultural use, recreational purposes and for 
nature’s needs. In different parts of the large country, however, there are different problems. For 
example, in southern Sweden, where much land is occupied by agriculture, there are problems with 
eutrophication. In other parts, acidification is a problem, and hydropower production clearly affects 
the ecosystems of the regulated rivers. During the latest years, water scarcity has occurred in some 
places, mainly in southern Sweden. 
In the Tullstorp Stream case, the status of the stream is according to the WFD classified as 
moderate and the river transports approximately 250 tons of N and 4 tons of phosphorous every year 
to the Baltic Sea [63]. In addition to the nutrients input from agriculture, private landowners not 
connected to the municipality sewage treatment can serve as an additional source of nutrients. In the 
area of Tullstorp Stream, ca. 200 out of 600 house properties in the catchment area are not connected 
to sewage treatment. One additional point of concern for the landowners was the uncertainty as to 
how legislation (especially WFD) would affect farmers in the future [63]. 
Appendix A.2.4. Present Governance System 
Implementation of the WFD has brought far-reaching change for water resource governance in 
Sweden. A new administration for river basin management was built up, in parallel with the old and 
still existing system, with relevant institutional structures formed accordingly [61]. Five super-
regional River Basin District (RBDs) were established, and in each RBD a regional Water Authority 
(Vattenmyndighet) is assigned as the competent authority. The Water Authority role is taken on by 
one of the regional county administrative boards (länsstyrelse) in the RBD, which is responsible for 
co-ordinating water management between the counties in the RBD [64]. 
Within each RBD, formal decision-making is mandated to a drafting committee 
(beredningssekretariat) comprised of experts appointed by the national government [61]. With the 
strong emphasis on RBDs and regional counties, national co-ordination became rather weak; 
consequently, a new national co-ordinating authority was set up in 2011 RBD. Local municipalities 
remain responsible for implementation. However, they also still have their own parallel and 
overlapping mandate in relation to physical planning, as well as their own decision-making system 
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which is based on local representative democracy. This situation makes the over-all system for water 
management in Sweden highly complex (overlapping administrative scales, mandates and different 
modes of decision-making). 
The Tullstorp stream project started in 2007 and, in 2009, local farmers and landowner founded 
the Tullstorp Stream Economic Association (TSEA), which is now responsible for the project. Formal 
decisions are taken by the board of representatives and a project manager is in charge of all 
administrative burdens. For the landowner, it is voluntary to participate. The association developed 
a process, where landowners are asked to participate and sign an agreement, giving the association 
the right to carry out activities connected to the restoration and future management on their land. 
The landowner still owns the land and can use it according to the agreement and receives financial 
compensation. For the first part of the restoration project, a stretch of the river was selected and all 
45 landowners signed the agreement [65]. 
Appendix A.2.5. Main Activities 
In the Tullstorp case, 35 wetlands with 105 hectares have been constructed and 10 km river has 
been restored between 2009 and 2016 [65]. Following measures were undertaken:  
• Creating wetlands; 
• Re-meandering of Tullstorp stream; 
• Creating flooding areas/ buffer zones; 
• Levelling the river banks; and 
• Tree planting. 
Appendix A.2.6. Stakeholder Resources 
The WFD has triggered the introduction of various mechanisms for public and stakeholder 
participation in Sweden, to complement the WFD induced top-down expert based decision-making 
mode. While Law 2004:660, which transposes the WFD into Swedish legislation, does not specify the 
role of public participation, there are three entry-points for active involvement. 
First, the main instrument for participation is a system of water councils at the sub-basin level 
[61]. There are about 100 water councils in Sweden. These can be created in a bottom-up manner by 
municipalities or water associations RBD [64], and they receive a small financial support from the 
WFD administration. The water councils function as sounding boards at every step of the planning 
processes, with the aim of incorporating local knowledge, and commenting on official proposals or 
preparing and presenting their own proposals RBD [64]. Second, representatives from the business 
sector and environmental groups can be appointed as experts to the Water Boards at the RBD scale 
[60]. Third, water boards and water councils are complemented by open consultations and reference 
groups at the national and regional levels. Reference groups comprise stakeholders such as farmers’ 
associations, forestry, NGOs and water companies, and provide a platform for information exchange 
and discussion of policies. 
Due to the change of perspective on the framing of the water problem many stakeholders are critical 
of the WFD. They believe that the environmental objectives (good ecological status) represent a nature 
preservationist perspective, and that the WFD work does not engage with the political side of water 
governance—making value trade-offs and democratic setting of priorities. 
For the Tullstorp stream case, stakeholder engagement is a key element of the case study. Many 
of the landowners took part in the planning from the very beginning and so made sure that their 
wishes were met. 
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Appendix A.3. Case Study Profile for the Province of Overijssel, The Netherlands—The Mutual Gains 
Approach in Recharge Areas of Vulnerable Drinking Water Abstractions 
Appendix A.3.1. Context 
Groundwater in the Netherlands is a major resource for drinking water. In the province of 
Overijssel, it is the only source for drinking water. As such, it must be carefully monitored and 
managed. Evaluation for the EU WFD showed that protection of this valuable resource needs 
improvement. The Drinking Water Protection File identifies necessary measures needed per water 
abstraction site. The Protection File is part of the Dutch national WFD implementation strategy, 
intended to improve the protection level of groundwater resources. It consists of a national top-down 
framework and a regional bottom-up process, which, respectively, enforces commitment and 
enhances stakeholder awareness regarding risks and actions needed regarding the identification and 
implementation of measures enhancing the protection level of groundwater resources RBD [66]. One 
of the measures to be implemented is focused on reduction of the nitrate leaching towards 
groundwater in the recharge areas of vulnerable abstraction sites in Overijssel. 
The groundwater hydrology in the Province of Overijssel is controlled by unconsolidated 
Quaternary sediments (e.g., [67]). The groundwater abstractions are located in regions with sandy 
unconfined aquifers of Pleistocene origin. Often, clay layers occur within the Pleistocene sand layers, 
dividing the system in two or more aquifers. Consequently, the regional geohydrological situation is 
heterogeneous, resulting in a wide range of travel times of groundwater flowing towards the 
abstraction wells. Infiltration of rainfall is by far the major contributor for the recharge in these sandy 
areas, with typical recharge figures of around 300 mm/year. 
Since 2011, the province of Overijssel and water company Vitens together with Wageningen 
University, Countus, Stimuland and Royal HaskoningDHV support dairy farmers to improve their 
mineral management in the recharge areas of five vulnerable drinking water abstractions. This 
mutual gain approach resulted in both a decrease in the nitrate concentration of the shallow phreatic 
groundwater and an increase of the economic result of the farm. The nitrate concentration decreased 
from approximately 90 to 75 mg NO3/L in the period 2011–2015 and the economic result of the 
implemented measures was approximately €97 per hectare. The approach therefore was supported 
by the farmers, their representatives and the boards of the province and water company. However, 
the WFD objectives are not yet met: neither for the farms that joined the project, nor in the remaining 
approximately 70% of the agricultural area in the recharge areas considered. 
To meet the WFD objectives, the scope of the project is widened. Major farms with a total area 
up to 50% of the agricultural area in the recharge areas were identified and invited to the project. The 
current participating farmers were helped to become more autonomous in identifying and 
implementing measures. At the same time, the role of these farmers changed from participant to 
ambassador and agricultural consultant towards potential new participants. Finally, the need to 
change the current agricultural practice was communicated to agricultural contractors and fertilizer 
and feed advisors. In addition, the approach has become a special-groundwater part of a province 
wide approach to improve agricultural practice. 
If initiatives are supported by regional policy, the approach and efforts of the farmers to adjust 
their management to meet the WFD objectives seem effective. There are no ready to use concepts for 
upscaling the initiatives to a level of participation that corresponds to 50% of the total agricultural 
area or more. From the preliminary results, it can be concluded that rolling out the approach of 
supporting each individual farmer is not possible—because the measure is on voluntary base and 
some farmers decline the invitation to join the project—and hardly feasible because of organizational 
and financial reasons. Newly developed approaches could be anchored by agricultural contractors. 
Therefore, there is a need to relate the approach to regional developments and institutional context. 
Meeting the WFD objectives in vulnerable areas is therefore only possible when there is a general or 
regional improvement of the mineral management as a basis with the possibility of additional 
support in the most vulnerable areas. 
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Appendix A.3.2. Problem to be Addressed 
How can the reduction targets be achieved in a manner that allow profitable agriculture to 
continue? Moreover, how can this be accomplished on a voluntary basis and without paying the 
farmers for implementing measures? 
Appendix A.3.3. Present Governance System 
The present governance system is centralised with the central government and ministry for Food 
and Environment, and related agencies making all decisions regarding use of agri-environmental 
measures, including norms for fertilizer use, at farm and field level. To monitor and control 
implementation, the government requires farmers to report detailed fertilizer and field plans for 
cropping systems and fertilizer use. Government monitoring focuses on relatively large groundwater 
bodies on the one hand and the quality of abstracted water at drinking water production sites at the 
other hand. 
The political choice in the Netherlands that WFD implementation should not lead to additional 
costs for the agricultural sector (Parliamentary Papers 2002, 27 625 Water Policy, Amendment Van 
der Vlies No. 92) implies that, in some vulnerable areas, the existing general rules on the use of 
manure and pesticides are insufficient to meet the WFD objectives [42]. At the same time, 
environmental policy has become embedded in the social and economic processes of parties other 
than governmental organizations, such as businesses, NGOs, and citizens [68]. Consequently, many 
spatial planning processes in the Netherlands are now organized as bottom-up processes in which 
the stakeholders negotiate with each other in a network structure instead of top-down processes with 
the government as the dominant party (e.g., [69–71]). The solution of environmental problems is no 
longer seen as the exclusive responsibility of government; rather, quasi-governmental organizations, 
the business community, civic organizations, and citizens are demanding a greater voice in resource 
planning [68]. Therefore, the pilot is based on voluntarism and mutual gain. 
Appendix A.3.4. Main Activities 
After setting-up of the Drinking Water Protection Files in 2009 and Programme of Measures in 
2010, the pilot project as one of the measures started in 2011. The main activities were local 
recruitment sessions to invite farmers, kitchen table meetings with interested farmers to get insight 
in their agricultural management and to identify and implement measures, group meetings, field 
excursions and the set-up of a groundwater monitoring network. Last year (2016), effort was put into 
increasing the autonomy of the existing group of 18 farmers and in recruitment of new farmers. 
Currently, 32 farmers participate with an agricultural area of approximately 30% of the total 
agricultural area within the recharge area of the abstraction sites.  
Appendix A.3.5. Stakeholder Resources 
Dutch farmers have a long tradition of cooperation among themselves and with authorities and 
researchers. Farmers are tired of the existing centralised governance regime. On the other hand, they 
are afraid of “Brussels” in a sense that high nitrate concentrations in groundwater may lead to loss of 
the derogation, which will have a strong financial impact. Due to policy changes over the last period, 
farmers consider the government as unreliable. Therefore, we address them as agricultural 
entrepreneurs and ask them to consider our offer as a business deal keeping in mind that 
participation is on a voluntary basis. Meanwhile, the farmers are enthusiastic over the project and 
they accept a role as ambassador show their farms, participate in meetings with other farmers, 
exchange experiences and ways of working, etc. However, the farmers do not feel responsible for 
recruiting new farmers to extend the participating agricultural area to meet the WFD standards at the 
scale of the recharge area. 
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Appendix A.3.6. Pressure for Change 
The pressure level for this case is major. Nitrogen mitigation is a very political and controversial 
issue of major significance for economy in the Dutch agricultural sector. 
Appendix A.4. Case Study Profile for the Catchment Based Approach in UK—Governance and Decentralized 
Decisions Making 
Appendix A.4.1. Context 
The origins of the Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) in England lie in the limitations, limited 
pubic participation, data inaccuracies and relatively top down approach of the first cycle of river 
basin management planning for implementation of the EU WFD. Lessons from research into more 
decentralized and participatory approaches, lobbying by environmental NGOs and a threatened 
application for a judicial review of the inadequacies of government plans, led by 2011 to recognition 
by government that more locally focused decision making and action should become central to future 
improvements to the water environment and in support of river basin management planning as part 
of Water Framework Directive activities. 
In early 2011, after talks with the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
and the Environment Agency (EA), WWF-UK and the Angling Trust withdrew their application for 
judicial review of the government’s implementation of the WFD, particularly in relation to River 
Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). The main commitments secured included: £110 million of new 
investment in environmental water quality through a new “catchment restoration fund”; a shift to 
more localised, catchment-based implementation of the directive, starting with 10 pilot catchments; 
investment in identifying the reasons for the decline of freshwater ecosystems; more vigorous 
enforcement of existing regulation, in particular regarding diffuse pollution; and a commitment to 
introducing stronger future regulation if necessary. 
The government’s policy framework for CaBA recognized that the water environment is affected 
by all activity on land as well as by abstracting, using and returning water to rivers, the sea and the 
ground; that catchments are the natural scale to consider this aspect of the environment, and that 
better coordinated action is desirable at the catchment level by all those who use water or influence 
land management; that this requires greater engagement and delivery by stakeholders at the 
catchment as well as local level, supported by the Environment Agency and other organisations. 
Finally, that these approaches are necessary when trying to address the significant pressures placed 
on the water environment by diffuse pollution from both agricultural and urban sources, and 
widespread, historical alterations to the natural form of channels [72]. 
The aim of the pilot catchments (expanded from 10 to 25) was to test the longer-term viability of 
the approach through developing a clear understanding of the issues in the catchment, involvement 
of local communities in decision-making by sharing evidence and prioritizing actions. In addition, 
the pilots looked for opportunities to better co-ordinate and integrate projects to address local issues 
in a more cost-effective way. The pilots were also important in starting to test and assess different 
ways of working, learning initial lessons around engagement, collaboration and catchment planning 
first hand [72]. 
Since 2013, CaBA has evolved from 25 pilot catchments to national coverage by 102 Catchment 
Partnerships (CPs). As a trial of stakeholder participation and partnership working, the programme 
stands out in its scope, timescales and remit. The government aims to support delivery of the EU 
Water Framework Directive but CPs generally choose to address an integrated land, water, 
environment and local economy agenda. CaBA is testing multi-level and polycentric co-governance, 
including the benefits of public participation, localism, and shared learning. Evidence of success is 
growing as illustrated below. 
Appendix A.4.2. Problem to be Addressed 
WFD delivery/implementation, including Article 14. More generally a better water environment. 
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Appendix A.4.3. Present Governance System 
River basin planning is the technical process for developing River Basin Management Plans. The 
Environment Agency (who is responsible for producing these plans) is the designated competent 
agency and will act as the link between river basin planning and the Catchment Based Approach. The 
CaBA is however also supplemented within a suite of statutory and voluntary actions, including advice, 
incentives, regulatory activity and other mechanisms to support the CaBA measures required [72]. 
Appendix A.4.4. Main Activities 
Each of the 102 partnerships has developed individually but with similarities: 85 have a steering 
group, 94 have developed a shared vision for their catchment, and 98 have a Catchment Action Plan. 
Nationally, over 36,000 people have been involved: each partnership has typically directly engaged 
between 60 and 200 individuals, and 20 different organisations across a range of sectors. Water 
companies and landowners are highly engaged groups, but fewer CPs have successfully engaged 
with Local Authorities and Local Enterprise Partnerships, although numbers are growing. 
To 2017, at least 1100 different activities have been reported across the partnerships with river 
habitat restoration the most common, followed by engagement, rural diffuse pollution and evidence 
investigation. A total in excess of £212 million has been invested, through collaborative working, in 
activities to improve the health of rivers and their catchments. Government has directly invested, 
through CP hosting costs, delivery funds, and other Environment Agency catchment partnership-
specific funding schemes, while funds leveraged by CPs from non-governmental sources total over 
£109 million (non-Government funding sources include water companies, EU funds, waste 
companies and landfill taxes, and lottery funds) [39]. 
“For every £1 directly invested by Government, the partnerships have raised £8.63 from 
nongovernmental funders. River and riparian restoration has been undertaken by 82% of 
partnerships, enhancing many kilometres of river. Although a number of partnerships are 
predominantly urban, 52% of partnerships have undertaken farmer engagement, providing advice 
to benefit both the farm business and the environment. Partnerships have implemented more than 
200 projects to open up rivers and streams to migratory fish and eel. 77% of partnerships have 
engaged with their local community, providing a range of volunteer opportunities and training in 
citizen science techniques including biological sampling and water quality monitoring” [39]. 
Appendix A.5. Case Study Profile for the Kocinka Catchment, Poland—Governance and the Need for 
Institutional Reforms 
Appendix A.5.1. Context 
The water management sector of Poland is currently in the process of organizational and 
structural reform. Driving the reform is the external pressure from the European Union for Poland to 
comply with water policy. At present, Poland risks financial penalization due to improper and 
insufficient transposition of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) [57] and Nitrates Directive (ND). 
In 2013, Poland was referred to the EU Court of Justice due to shortcomings in domestic transposition, 
including the absence of Annexes and gaps in monitoring of water status. In the same year, Poland 
was also referred to the Court for failing to address water pollution stemming from nitrates by 
designating an insufficient amount of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs), along with the lack of 
effective measures. The ND has proven to be problematic as demonstrated by the fact that every 
Member State has experienced difficulties in fulfilling their respective implementation duties. The 
point of departure of the case study is to examine the potential of co-governance to address non-point 
source pollution control in Poland. 
Poland dedicates approximately half of its total land area to agricultural activities. A significant 
portion is dedicated to livestock production, which produces a high amount of nitrate pollution. As 
a Baltic state, 98% of its surface waters drain to the Baltic Sea. Further, Poland makes up half of the 
total population of the Baltic Sea Basin. Based on these conditions, Poland constitutes the state with 
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the greatest influence on the ecological status of the Baltic Sea. Indeed, monitoring data demonstrate 
that Poland contributes the most nitrate runoff. There is external pressure from the EU to improve 
water management through greater Directive compliance performance. Therefore, the state faces 
considerable pressure to reduce nitrate pollution stemming from agricultural sources to improve 
quality status of both fresh and marine waters. 
Poland has made recent amendments to its Water Law to meet formal EU transposition 
requirements. Despite attempts of structural reform, further measures are necessary to deliver upon 
the principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), which the WFD is built upon. An 
integral aspect is stakeholder participation in realizing IWRM. The case study will evaluate the 
opportunities and barriers to realizing water co-governance in Poland. The assessment is based on a 
review of the existing water management system and includes the following components to evaluate 
overall governance capacity to realizing co-governance: (i) the existing institutional structure and 
arrangements (ii) administrative culture; (iii) social capital and the capacity of civil society; and (iv) 
perceptions towards public participation. 
The Polish Case Study is the Kocinka catchment. It is located in the south of Poland in the Oder 
River Basin. The catchment is mostly agricultural with pine forests dominating in the lower reach. 
The Kocinka region is considered fairly representative of Poland with regard to soil types, land use 
and agricultural practices. Crops are generally rain-fed and do not require irrigation, although areas 
with light soil may be irrigated during dry spells, and raising the retention capacity of the soil in these 
areas is considered highly desirable. The number of part-time farms in the Kocinka region is high at 
2000 supplementing their farm income through off-farm work, in comparison to 3255 full-time 
farmers. In the areas surrounding Kocinka—in Lubliniec County in particular—the main crops are 
rye, wheat, oats, barley and potatoes, and animal husbandry, where present, focuses on pig farming. 
The use of pesticides and mineral fertilizers is often limited by financial constraints, and the level of 
mechanization is low. In addition, the Kocinka River is popular for trout fishery. Agricultural land 
constitutes 71% of the entire Kocinka catchment with 4656 farms cultivating 13,780,645 ha. The 
Kocinka catchment is not considered a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone, but it is regarded as eutrophic, or at 
a high risk of eutrophication, with high surface water levels in nitrate and phosphorus especially due 
to agricultural use of fertilizer. 
Appendix A.5.2. Problem to be Addressed 
Member States, such as Poland, face considerable constraints in terms of managing nitrate 
pollution stemming from agricultural sources. There is also greater responsibility and pressure on 
the state to do more to achieve nitrate reduction targets [73]. Confronting the national context of 
Poland highlights the challenge of achieving higher water quality standards for Europe. Despite a 
confluence of constraining factors, is there potential for co-governance in the Polish case? 
Polish Case 
At this time, even though there is a major or severe level of external pressure for change at the 
national level, other factors in the Polish case make water co-governance challenging, and, in the 
future, this may also influence the pressure level for change on a more local level. 
The water management sector of Poland is currently in the process of organizational and 
structural reform. The reform is driven by external pressure from the EU to improve water 
management through greater Directive compliance performance. Therefore, Poland faces 
considerable pressure to reduce DWPA to improve quality status of both fresh and marine waters. In 
this context, the opportunities for co-governance to address DWPA in Poland could prove useful. 
Considering the various pressures on the Polish State in terms of harmonizing domestic 
legislation with EU obligations, participatory approaches are not a priority of the State. The 
requirement of the inclusion of public participation in water management is interpreted and applied 
in a narrow manner, with minimal measures being applied. Public participation is interpreted as a 
consultation process, where knowledge transfer is a one-way transaction, consisting of water experts 
and officials informing the public of its activities. 
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Appendix A.5.3. Present Governance System 
Water management in Poland is largely governed from top-down, with the central government 
being the key actor in the decision-making process. The current structure consists of a two-tiered 
centralized system headed by the Ministry of the Environment and the National Water Management 
Authority (NWMA). The NWMA oversees the seven Regional Water Management Boards, which 
govern ten water basins in Poland. The structure was institutionalized based on the Water Law of 
2001 under the provision of disseminating water management from the national to the regional level. 
National plans are prepared by the President of NWMA and regional plans are prepared by the 
respective Directors of the RWMBs. The specifications set forth in the regional plans are to be carried 
out by municipal authorities. There are current plans to further reform the structure and system of 
water management to meet compliance measures with EU legislative requirements and to enhance 
implementation performance of the Polish state as previously stated above. 
Appendix A.5.4. Main Activities 
At present, Poland has made amendments to its Water Law to meet formal EU transposition 
requirements. The Water Law was introduced in 2001 and constitutes the main legal framework for 
water policy. The 2017 structural reforms include the restructuring of public institutions responsible 
for the management of water resources, in addition to the abolishment of fee exemptions, while 
concurrently raising fee prices. The draft also includes a provision of introducing a unified 
organizational unit called Państwowe Gospodarstwo Wodne “Wody Polskie” which is responsible 
for the supervision of integrating water management agencies and their activities. The introduction 
of the new institution is aimed at addressing insufficiencies within the current water management 
system. The designation of a government agency dedicated to coordination and the promotion of 
inter-sectoral integration is aimed at the fulfilment of harmonization with legislation of the Water 
Framework Directive, along with the Nitrates Directive. 
Appendix A.5.5. Stakeholder Resources 
Poland is characterized by a weak civil society with low social capital levels [47,48], which 
constitute a hindrance to realizing co-governance. Low social capital levels are indicative of a lack of 
trust and unwillingness to engage through cooperative and participative means. The lack of a 
participatory culture in Poland is a major barrier to realizing co-governance. 
Appendix A.5.6. Pressure for Change 
Poland faces a confluence of constraining factors, along with considerable external pressure to 
reform the state’s water management system and reduce nitrate pollution. High nutrient loadings to 
the Baltic Sea, in tandem with court proceedings by the European Court of Justice for failure to 
comply with both the Nitrates and Water Framework Directives highlight the severity of the Polish 
situation. 
For the Kocinka case study, there seems to be a low pressure for change (the pressure is rather 
economically driven) because many farmers are only part-time farmers and are not involved and do 
not seem to want to be involved in governance processes. Therefore, there is no recognition for the 
need of change on the local level. 
Appendix A.6. Case Study Profile for Minnesota State, USA—1 Watershed 1 Plan—The Water Quality 
Framework 
Appendix A.6.1. Context 
Minnesota has a long history of water management by local government. The One Watershed, 
One Plan (1W1P) also referred to as the watershed water quality framework is rooted in this history. 
The 1W1P was initiated, in 2011, at a round table with local the local government units (Association 
of Minnesota Counties, Minnesota Association of Watershed Districts, and Minnesota Association of 
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Soil and Water Conservation Districts). The roundtable recommended that water resource 
management should be based on catchment boundaries. 
The State of Minnesota, USA, contains the source of the Mississippi River, which flows over 3730 
km south through or adjacent to 10 states, before entering the Gulf of Mexico. Over the past several 
decades, it had become increasingly evident that the symptoms of eutrophication in the Gulf of 
Mexico were spreading due to increased nutrient loads, resulting in the degradation of water quality 
[37]. In response, the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force was 
established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), and, as part of the 
revised 2008 Action Plan, 12 basin states were called to develop state-level nutrient reduction 
strategies by 2013 to improve water quality in the Mississippi River Basin, and ultimately reduce, 
mitigate, and control hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico (Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed 
Nutrient Task Force, 2008). These strategies were intended to be a collaborative effort, combining 
both current and new nutrient reduction efforts. 
Appendix A.6.2. Problem to be Addressed 
In the Minnesota reduction strategy, the goal is stated: “The goal of the Minnesota Nutrient 
Reduction Strategy is to guide the state in reducing excess nutrients in waters, so that in-state and 
downstream water quality goals are met [74]. The goal is to achieve 45% reduction in phosphorus 
and a 20% reduction in current nitrogen concentrations to the Mississippi River by 2025, and a 45% 
reduction by 2040” [75]. 
Appendix A.6.3. Present Governance System 
At the same time that the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force was 
meeting (2008), voters in the State of Minnesota passed the historic Clean Water, Land and Legacy 
Amendment to the Minnesota Constitution. This Legacy Amendment imposed a three-eighths of one 
percent sales tax for 25 years, until 2034, for the sake of cleaner water, healthier habitat, better parks 
and trails and sustaining the arts and cultural heritage. Thirty-three percent of these funds were 
allocated directly to the Clean Water Fund, which may only be spent to protect, enhance, and restore 
water quality in lakes, rivers, and streams and to protect groundwater from degradation. 
This was a game-changer for water resource management in Minnesota. With this increased 
funding, public expectations drove the need for improved coordination amongst the State’s water 
management agencies. 
Appendix A.6.4. Main Activities 
In response to the demand to meet public expectations, the Water Quality Framework was 
developed to enhance coordination and clarify roles in an integrated water governance structure so 
that it is clear who is responsible at each stage in the process, enhancing the efficiency for 
collaboration between state and local partners. 
The policy framework transitioned from top-down management to a bottom-up approach, 
systematically delivering data, research, and analysis while empowering local action and 
implementation. The Water Quality Framework begins with Monitoring and Assessment through a 
watershed-based approach to systematically assess the condition of lakes and streams on a ten-year 
cycle, to inform future implementation activities. State agencies lead these monitoring efforts, with 
the assistance from the local government units (LGUs) within the watershed. Water resource 
characterization and problem identification incorporates science and data synthesis into the 
Framework through the use of models and spatial mapping tools to encourage the understanding of 
interactions, stressors and threats to the watershed. Private consultants or researchers are commonly 
contracted to complete these assessments using the best science and resources available. Water 
Restoration and Protection Strategies (WRAPS) are developed for each watershed based on the data 
summarized through the characterization process. The WRAPS identify priority sub-watersheds and 
inform local planning. Community input through a public participation process helps to incorporate 
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local knowledge into the summarized strategies. Comprehensive watershed management is driven 
by the LGUs to ensure a local commitment for prioritized, targeted and measurable actions. 
This comprehensive assessment resulted in a document referred to as One Watershed One Plan 
(1W1P). All local, state and federal agencies join together to inform the process, but ultimately the 
implementation plan is driven by the priorities of local stakeholders to refine the previously 
identified watershed-based strategies into an actionable path forward. 
Appendix A.6.5. Stakeholder Resources 
The first round of 1W1P pilot projects were launched in 2014 with the intent to build on existing 
watershed efforts, using local plans together with state and local knowledge, implementing a 
systematic and science-based approach to watershed management. A successful program requires 
clear communication regarding roles and expectations. Results from the experience indicated that 
time and patience was essential to the development of the partnerships to create a watershed-based 
management plan following a co-governance structure. Taking time at the beginning to coordinate 
and ensure clear and consistent communication, encourages the development of a smooth process. 
Including stakeholders with a range of expertise, backgrounds, and perspectives into the partnership 
and valuing their input resulted in a higher level of trust, which should lead to improved strategy 
adoption and implementation. As the 1W1P process evolves, there will be a less aggressive timeline 
to help alleviate the frustration of rapid coordination, which should result in a larger number of 
stakeholders and public participants included in discussions [76]. 
Appendix A.6.6. Pressure for Change 
In Minnesota, the citizens voted in 2008 for an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution, which 
resulted in a 25-year sales tax increase for the sake of cleaner water, healthier habitat, better parks, 
sustained arts and heritage. This was a game-changer for water resource management in Minnesota. 
With this increased funding, public expectations drove the need for improved coordination amongst 
the State’s water management agencies. The external pressure for change led to the development of 
a catchment-based water quality framework, transitioning from a top-down management approach 
to a bottom-up water co-governance approach, systematically delivering data, research and analysis 
while empowering local action and implementation. 
Appendix A.7. Case Study Profile for the Murray Darling Basin, Australia—Governance Structures and 
Water Market 
Appendix A.7.1. Context 
The Murray Darling Basin covers one million square km, approximately one seventh of the 
Australian continent. The Basin encompasses four of the Australian States, namely Victoria, New 
South Wales South Australia and Queensland. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, water 
management is a responsibility of the States. The Commonwealth or national Government wields 
influence through its financial powers, or through the implementation of international treaties such 
as the Ramsar Convention governing the protection of wetlands. 
Governance of the Murray Darling Basin was one the most difficult challenges during the 
negotiations to form a federation. The conflicts of interest were a substantial barrier and it took some 
15 years before the governance of the Basin took shape with agreement on bulk water sharing and 
creation of the River Murray Commission. The River Murray Commission had four Commissioners, 
one each from Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and the Commonwealth. 
The Commission had powers to initiate construction of dams, weirs and locks along the river, 
and to direct their operation. The States supervised the construction and provided operational staff 
for the works within their boundaries. The costs of capital works were shared equally among the four 
Governments, and the operational costs were shared equally among the three States. Requirement of 
consensus was a key principle of governance: all the Commissioners had to agree before anything 
could happen. Consensus had a great strength: when consensus was reached, all parties had reached 
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agreement and the outcome would be implemented effectively. However, consensus also had a 
weakness in that it took a long time to reach a consensus over difficult issues. 
The River Murray Commission oversaw a large increase in construction of dams and weirs to 
provide reliable water supplies for irrigation. Construction boomed between the end of the Second 
World War and 1980. Some 13,000 GL were being diverted from the Murray River and its southern 
tributaries to irrigate 14,000 square km. Australia is an ancient dry continent and salt has accumulated 
in the landscape over millennia. While having economic benefits, the massive increase in irrigation 
started mobilising the salt and river salinity started increasing and by the early 1980s salinity levels 
at Morgan in South Australia exceeded 800 EC units (500 mg/L) for 18 months on end. 
Appendix A.7.2. Problem to be Addressed 
Ideally, drinking water should have less than 800 EC (WHO aesthetic limit) and horticultural 
crops are impacted above 500 EC. The increasing trend in salinity alarmed South Australia, the 
downstream State. 
Appendix A.7.3. Present Governance System 
Meanwhile, the irrigation districts in Victoria and New South Wales, the two upstream States, 
were suffering the effects of high water tables, and both States were seeking to improve the drainage 
systems and discharge more saline water into the River. South Australia, the downstream State 
suffering most from rising river salinities, objected vigorously. The River Murray Commission’s role 
did not include water quality and was unable to intervene, so nothing happened. Concerns about 
rising salinity levels provided the political impetus to reform governance by creating the Murray 
Darling Basin Commission (MDBC). 
The role of the MDBC was expanded from the River Murray to include the whole Murray 
Darling Basin and its water related natural resources including water quality issues. Three 
Commissioners were appointed representing water, environment and agricultural agencies from 
each jurisdiction and an Independent President presided over their meetings. Importantly, the 
Commission now reported to a Ministerial Council responsible for decision making key decisions. 
Appendix A.7.4. Main Activities 
Development and implementation of a Salinity and Drainage Strategy was the first task of the 
new Commission. 
In summary, the Strategy included the following elements. 
Defined: 
• A salinity target of 800 EC units at Morgan in SA (a modelled target) 
• Salinity debits and credits as tradeable pollution rights 
• Accountable actions 
• A benchmark climatic period for modelling the target 
Established: 
• Systems for salinity monitoring and reporting  
• A Register of salinity debits and credits  
• An Independent Audit Group 
• Peer review and accreditation of models for system behaviour and accountable actions 
• Comprehensive reviews at five-year intervals 
Invested: 
• In salt interception schemes along the River on the basis of cost effectiveness regardless of 
geographic location to create 80 EC credits at Morgan in South Australia 
Allocated: 
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• 50 EC credits to improving the river  
• 15 EC credits to each of the two upstream State so that their irrigation systems could be drained 
Required 
• All three States to remain in credit on the Register 
The Strategy provided a top down governance framework that co-ordinated the work of 
community groups in the 14 irrigation districts in the southern Basin to develop local Salinity 
Management Plans. The Salinity and Drainage Strategy provides an example of balancing top down 
governance establishing targets and directing investment with bottom up governance reflecting the 
practicalities of addressing local problems. The Strategy has been reviewed every 15 years to 
accommodate changing circumstances and priorities. While the Salinity target has now been 
achieved, there is no room for complacency; continued vigilance and ongoing, rigorous 
implementation of the Strategy is required to ensure long term future. 
Pressure for Change 
The salinity issue in the Murray Darling Basin would be rated between Major and Severe, which 
is a major factor in achieving joint action and community support. If the historical trends in the early 
1980s had been allowed to continue unchecked, the drinking water supplies of the city Adelaide (1 
million people) and the regional towns along the Murray River would have been severely impacted. 
The irrigated horticultural industries would also have been severely impacted. Upstream irrigation 
areas would have been impacted by inability to properly drain them and discharge the drainage 
water to the river. 
Appendix B. Overview of Institutional Arrangements Indicators 
Table A1. Analysis of task allocation, showing an overview of responsibility for “who makes 
decisions” (who is responsible for which tasks) in the different steps in decision making (a)–(j). 
Case Studies 
Tasks—“who is responsible for which tasks”: C = Central; R = Regional; L = local 
Policy formulation 
(a) Choosing goal 
(b) Setting targets 
(c) Allocation of resources for action plans 
(d) Prepare action plans 
(e) Approve action plans 
Policy implementation 
(f) Implementation 
(g) Receipt of resources for action plans 
Policy evaluation 
(h) Monitoring and control 
(i) Data collection 
(j) Data use 
Policy formulation: 
(a) Choosing goals, for water quality. 
(b) Setting targets (who and which agency/agencies is/are responsible for corresponding DWPA 
targets. These can take the form of targets for specific water uses such as drinking and 
environmental water quality standards, or emission levels for water pollutants). 
(c) Allocating resources for action plan, (who and which agency/agencies is/are responsible for 
financing, also how are action plans financed, e.g., through charges and taxes, grants, etc.). 
(d) Prepare action plans (who and which agency/agencies is/are responsible for preparing the action 
plans). 
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(e) Approve action plans (who and which agency/agencies is/are responsible for approving the action 
plans). 
Policy implementation: 
(f) Implementation (at which level are the plans and goals implemented, involving the funding of 
measures and a division of labour. Separate tasks exist for the implementation of measures and 
policies to achieve this that can be shared between public, private and civil society actors). 
(g) Receipt of resources for action plans (who are the receiver of resources and funding in the 
implementation). 
Policy evaluation: 
(h) Monitoring and control (at which level are enforcement in terms of monitoring and control taking 
place). 
(i) Data collection (who and which agency/agencies is/are responsible for the data collection of 
DWPA). 
(j) Data use (who uses data and for which purposes). 
Appendix C. Overview of Co-Governance Indicators 
Appendix C.1. Pressure for Change (Low, Moderate, Major, Severe) 
Low: Partial failure to meet nationally set standards/targets. Unlikely to incur regulatory penalties 
from a higher authority. Of low societal concern (or awareness/understanding) or low political 
concern. Unlikely to result in more than incremental change over time to existing regulation, 
policies and procedures/actions. 
Moderate: Complete or partial failure to meet nationally set standards/targets. May incur regulatory 
penalties from a higher authority. Prompts some societal concern (e.g., action or lobbying by 
“specialised” NGOs or community groups). Prompts moderate political concern and some 
evidence of action through policy change and/or budgetary allocation within conventional 
planning, policy and budgetary cycles. 
Major: Significant and pressing failure to meet nationally set standards/targets. Likely to incur 
regulatory penalties from a higher authority. Prompts widespread societal awareness, concern 
and action (lobbying, communications, legal action, etc.). Prompts clear political prioritisation 
and clear evidence of action in the form of policy change and/or budgetary allocation within or 
in addition to conventional planning, policy and budgetary cycles. 
Severe: Emergency (short term) or chronic (continuing) environmental disasters or degradation. 
Certain to incur penalties from a higher authority if of a relevant type. Prompts widespread 
media coverage, societal awareness and responses/actions. Prompts immediate political 
response including action through emergency or other direct/explicit measures. 
Appendix C.2. Water Governance Capacity for Public Sector (Weak, Medium, Strong) 
Weak: Limited capability exists to develop, facilitate and support co-production of knowledge and 
plans, and shared authority and responsibilities for implementation, with lower level and non-
state actors. 
Medium: There is localised evidence/examples that some capability exists to develop, facilitate and 
support co-production of knowledge and plans, and shared authority and responsibilities for 
implementation, with lower level and non-state actors. 
Strong: Evidence exists of nationwide capability to develop, facilitate and support co-production of 
knowledge and plans, and shared authority and responsibilities for implementation, with lower 
level and non-state actors. 
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Appendix C.3. Water Governance Capacity for Civil Society (Weak, Medium, Strong) 
Weak: No or only limited capability exists amongst national NGOs or other community-based 
organisations to mobilise stakeholder engagement or wider public awareness and participation, 
and to engage with relevant public sector agencies for co-production of knowledge and plans, 
and shared authority and responsibilities for implementation. 
Medium: There is localised evidence/examples that some capability exists amongst national NGOs 
or other community-based organisations to mobilise stakeholder engagement or wider public 
awareness and participation, and to engage with relevant public sector agencies for co-
production of knowledge and plans, and shared authority and responsibilities for 
implementation. 
Strong: Evidence exists of well-developed nationwide capability amongst national NGOs or other 
community-based organisations to mobilise stakeholder engagement or wider public awareness 
and participation, and to engage with relevant public sector agencies for co-production of 
knowledge and plans, and shared authority and responsibilities for implementation. 
Appendix C.4. Effectiveness (None, Weak, Moderate, Good, Excellent) 
None: No evidence of positive outcomes (or at least reduced or halted negative outcomes).  
Weak: Limited evidence of positive outcomes (or at least reduced or halted negative outcomes). 
Moderate: Clear localised examples or other evidence of positive outcomes (or at least reduced or 
halted negative outcomes). 
Good: Widespread and continuing evidence of positive outcomes/improvement. 
Excellent: Widespread and continuing evidence of positive outcomes and achievement or near 
achievement of goals. 
Table A2. Co-governance criteria. 
Co-Governance Criteria Scale 
Pressure for change Low, moderate, major, severe 
Water governance capacity for public sector Weak, medium, strong 
Water governance capacity for civil society Weak, medium, strong 
Effectiveness 
- Goal achievement None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
- Cost effectiveness 1—desired outcomes being delivered affordably with 
the use of available resources 
None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
- Cost effectiveness 2—desired outcomes being delivered at a lower cost 
than by alternative means as far as can be determined or judged 
None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
- Development and use of innovative solutions None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
- Use of local knowledge and data 1—Knowledge sharing—
openness/accessibility of public sector scientific data (including that of 
municipalities and water companies 
None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
- Use of local knowledge and data 2—Co-production of knowledge—
combined use of scientific data and local knowledge/data 
None, weak, moderate, good, excellent 
Appendix D. Survey Structure 
Q1: Case study information 
 Yes No Specify 
The case study is an ongoing water co-governance project    
The case study is about a finished water co-governance project    
The case study is about a (possible) future water co-governance project    
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Q2: Which policy phase is the co-governance case in: 
Policy Phase Yes No 
Problem identification (Initiation/agenda setting)   
Policy Formulation   
Policy Implementation   
Monitoring   
Policy evaluation   
Q2A: How is the water management/planning structures, organized in your country and who is 
responsible? 
 Yes No 
River Basin Management Plans   
Programmes of Measures   
Action plans   
Other   
Q3: Indicate whether the following stakeholders have been involved (yes or no) and, if so, to what 
degree? 
Stakeholder Group Involved Yes No 
Degree of Involvement 
Weak Moderate Good Excellent 
Local governmental bodies       
Regional governmental bodies       
Central governmental bodies       
Environmental NGOs       
Farmer       
Farmers organizations       
General public       
Others, specify:       
Others, specify:       
Q4: Which mechanisms have been used to involve stakeholders? 




Responsible for Involvement 




Website with general information      
Leaflets and printed newsletters      
Survey/opinion polls      
Information at public events such 
as exhibitions and information 
markets 
     
Publication of meeting minutes 
and other case study documents 
     
Possibility to comment in writing      
Public hearings      
Field trips/excursions      
Interactive workshops for 
collective assessments and 
planning 
     
One-to-one meetings “kitchen 
table meetings” e.g., at the house 
of a farmer 
     
Citizens own initiative 
(Stakeholder initiated) 
     
Citizens juries       
Involvement in official structures 
(steering boards etc.) 
     
Other mechanisms:      
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Q5: Does the co-governance case improve the quality of decisions? 
Yes   No 
If yes, how: 
Q6: Does the co-governance case study increase legitimacy? 
Yes   No 
If yes, what form of legitimacy: 
Q6A: Input legitimacy:  
About inclusion: Are the involved stakeholders representative for the issue at stake? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
In what sense? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Are both directly and indirectly affected stakeholders involved? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
How were they invited and involved? 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
About consensus: does it promote mutual agreement among participants? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
In what way? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
How is it ensured that critical voices or minority groups are not excluded? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 





How/in what way? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Q6B: Output legitimacy:  
About acceptance: are the rules/decision making accepted? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
About enforcement/compliance: Is compliance verified and non-compliance sanctioned?  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Q7: Has the co-governance case study helped in developing ownership of the problem adressed? 
Yes     No  
If yes in what kind of way? 
Developing commitment 







Q8: Has the governance case study helped in solving conflicts between stakeholders? 
Yes 
If yes in what kind of way? 
______________________________________________________________ 
No, there was not really any significant conflicts 
No, the conflict or conflicts still exists 
______________________________________________________________ 


















Appendix E. List of Participants in the International Workshop 
Table A3. List of participants. 
Name Institution 
John Langford Melbourne University, Australia 
Cors van den Brink Royal HaskoningDHV, Netherlands 
Beatrice Hedelin Karlstad University, Sweden 
Alistair Maltby Rivers Trust, England 
Laurence Smith SOAS, England 
Jes Pedersen Region Midt, Denmark 
Keld Rasmussen Horsens Municipality, Denmark 
Grit Martinez Ecologic Institute, Germany 
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Nico Stelljes Ecologic Institute, Germany 
Morten Graversgaard Aarhus University, Denmark 
Jens Christian Refsgaard GEUS, Denmark 
Anker Lajer Højberg GEUS, Denmark 
Flemming Gertz SEGES, Denmark 
Irene A. Wiborg SEGES, Denmark 
Ylva Engwall 
Swedish Agency for Marine and 
Water Management 
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